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Abstract 
 
According to leading economic theorists, creating capitalism out of communism requires 
rapid privatization. In this article we empirically test the welfare implications of 
privatization policies in Post-Soviet countries by using cross-national panel mortality data 
as an indicator of social costs. We find that rapid privatization – whether measured by a 
novel measure of mass privatization program implementation or Enterprise Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development privatization outcome scores – is a critical determinant 
of life expectancy losses, and that when privatization policies are reversed, life 
expectancy improves. Using selection models, we show that endogeneity understates the 
social costs of rapid privatization. 
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Intro 
A central tenet of “transition economics”, as propounded by leading theorists 
Jeffrey Sachs, Andrei Shleifer, and Stanley Fischer, is that rapid privatization is crucial 
for successful transformation of a planned into a market economy (M. Boycko, A. 
Shleifer, R. Vishny 1995, S. Fischer and A. Gelb 1991, J. Sachs 1992, 1994).
1 While 
cross-country empirical research evaluating the effects of rapid privatization policies on 
economic growth has produced mixed results (J. Bennett, S. Estrin, J. Maw, G. Urga, 
2004, N. Campos and F. Coricelli, 2002, E. Falcetti, M. Raiser and P. Sanfey 2002, V. 
Popov 2000, J. Sachs 1996), relatively few studies have examined their effects on the 
alarming social costs associated with transition.
2 In this paper, we operationalize rapid 
privatization using a novel measure of mass privatization program implementation and 
two measures of small- and large-scale privatization outcomes from the Enterprise Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. To capture the social costs of transition we exploit 
rich cross-country variation in male life expectancy and disease-specific mortality data.  
We find that rapid privatization is a critical determinant of life expectancy losses, 
and that when privatization policies are reversed, life expectancy improves. By using size 
of titular nationalities, log external debt levels, and regional dummies as instruments, we 
find that failing to take endogeneity into account understates the relationship between 
privatization and its associated social costs. We also show that privatization was 
                                                 
1 “The need to accelerate privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern 
Europe. If there is no breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the near future, the 
entire process could be stalled for years to come. Privatization is urgent and politically vulnerable” 
(Jeffrey Sachs, 1992). 
2 For an exception see Elizabeth Brainerd (1998), “Market reform and mortality in transition countries” 
World Development. inasmuch economically determined as it was socially determined – conditioned by 
political interactions with existing social structures. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the model 
specification and identification strategy; Section 3 describes the data; and Section 4 
presents the results, followed by a concluding section which discusses some policy 
implications. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
There are three main econometric issues of assessing the effect of privatization on 
mortality: (i) measurement error, (ii) coding bias and (iii) endogenous selection bias.  
  First, the Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
constructed two widely used scales of progress in small- and large-scale privatization 
from a planned (coded as 1) to a market (coded as 4.3) economy (Table 1). A major 
limitation to these indices – aside from the evident non-linearity in their effects – is that 
they measure privatization outcomes rather than implementation. Countries that failed to 
fully implement privatization may have done so because the social costs were too great – 
an effect obscured by only scoring countries which successfully effected privatization 
more highly.
3 Thus, to assess the full social costs of privatization, measurement of the 
implementation of privatization, irrespective of privatization outcome, is critical. Second, 
since EBRD economists who constructed the privatization measures were also key policy 
advisors, there might be ideological pressure to code successful countries as more 
                                                 
3 In several transition countries ambitious privatization agendas were announced by policymakers 
following early democratic regime changes in the early 1990s. Progress was stymied, or even reversed, 
after the initial waves of privatization reforms due to popular resistance (See L. King and A. Sznajder 
2006). “privatized”, especially since country performance in a given year has already been 
observed at the moment of coding (E. Falcetti, M. Raiser, and P. Sanfey, 2002, B. 
Merlevede and K. Schoors, 2004). Third, higher privatization scores strongly relate to 
other positive transition outcomes such as greater democratization and non-corrupt 
government regulation. Building these observed and unobserved factors into the 
privatization measure will bias the direction of the findings in line with their effects on 
social costs. 
To overcome these limitations we have designed a novel measure of mass 
privatization based upon country descriptions in the EBRD Transition Report series and 
codings used for the EBRD privatization indices. The halfway point on the EBRD large-
scale privatization scale, or a coding of 3, involves privatization of more than 25 percent 
of large-scale enterprise assets (Table 1). We code an indicator for whether a country 
implemented a program that transferred the ownership of at least 25% of large-state 
owned enterprises to the private sector through vouchers and give-aways to firm 
insiders.
4  
More challenging is the need to cope with endogeneity in the policy decision to 
adopt rapid privatization as a capitalist reform strategy. Our analysis follows a quasi-
natural experiment approach, which has been strongly advocated by both statisticians and 
economists for evaluating the effects of policy interventions (J. Angrist and A. Krueger, 
2002, D. Freedman 1999). The key advantage is that country implementation of rapid 
privatization can be treated as independent, such that outcome differentials across these 
strata can be directly attributed to the policy. Mass privatization seems to be a promising 
                                                 
4 We have also consulted with EBRD and WB transition economists as a second check on the validity of 
these codings for rapid privatization. candidate for this framework, particularly since the reform itself was intended to operate 
as an ‘economic shock,’ rapidly inducing the formation of a capitalist class (C. Gerry and 
C. Li, 2002).  
The independence assumption that underlies evaluation of the treatment effect of 
the policy, however, will not be unbiased if policy changes are driven by politicians’ and 
stakeholders’ motives in ways that relate to health outcomes (i.e., E[Dit, Zit] ≠ 0 and E[Zit, 
Hit] ≠ 0).  Although recent comparative studies by economists have assumed privatization 
and its different methods of implementation to be exogenous policy choices (J. Bennett, 
et al 2004. M. Boycko, et al 1995), we proceed by carefully assessing potential sources of 
endogeneity using instrumental and selection models.  
 
Endogenous Selection Bias 
 
There are several well-established statistical methods that can be employed to 
account for endogenous selection bias (e.g., matching, instrumentation, and statistical 
adjustments).  It seems straightforward to adapt a “Heckman-type” selection model  (J 
Heckman, 1979) or “control function” (J. Heckman and S. Navarro-Lozano 2004) to the 
problem of selection bias; by means of this a selection equation and an outcome equation 
are jointly estimated, assuming a bivariate normal error term in the two equations, to cope 
with bias resulting from selection on unobservables. We acknowledge that this strategy 
has been critiqued for sensitivity to the model specification, problems with collinearity, 
and reliance on distributional assumptions in cases where independent variables for 
selection and the outcome equation are the same (A. Sartori 2003, F. Vella 1998, C. Winship and R. Mare, 1992, C. Winship and S. Morgan 1999). Therefore we generate 
instruments for privatization based upon findings from the sociology literature in addition 
to performing tests for their validity.  
We argue that policy choices to pursue rapid and extensive privatization were in 
part conditioned by i) ethnic structures, ii) regional policy diffusion, and iii) debt 
relationships to the IMF, WB and EBRD. First, we hypothesize that newly independent 
political elites use mass privatization programs to remove the ethnic Russian managers 
that had immigrated to the non-Russian republics to fill positions established by Soviet 
industrialization. Kogut and Spicer suggest a similar dynamic within Russia to oust all-
Soviet forces (B. Kogut and A. Spicer, 2005).
5 Second, the theory of mimetic 
isomorphism, or policy diffusion, suggests that the adoption of policies by leading 
regional countries, such as Russia, will trigger other countries to follow suit. Lastly, since 
external advisors played an influential role in advising rapid privatization, their influence 
would have been the greatest for countries with greater debt levels. We will use the 
relative size of the ethnic Russian minority stratified into three categories, regional 
variables, and the log of total external debt as instruments for whether a country 
implemented rapid privatization as a property reform strategy.
6  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is reasonable to infer that relatively fixed historical factors, such as ethnic nationality, preceded rather 
than followed mass privatization programs. 
6 All instruments z are satisfy the first condition of correlation with treatment d – Cov[zit, dit], but the 
second condition of uncorrelatedness with heterogeneity in outcomes – Cov[zit,εit] = 0 – cannot be directly 
tested. Data and Methods 
Our panel data set covers 25 transition countries from 1989 to 2002, using the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2005 edition for economic data, the 
Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Indicators for 
economic policy variables, and the WHO European Health for All and WHO Mortality 
databases for health data. Table 1 summarizes variables composing the basic model and 
their correlation matrix. Appendix 1 defines all variables, presents descriptive statistics 
and lists data sources. 
 
Table 1. Descriptions of Rapid Structural Privatization Variables from the 
Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
 
Mean Score  Measure of 
Privatization 
Description of Coding 
1991     2002 
Mass 
Privatization 
Scale: 0 prior to implementation, 1 thereafter 
0   Country did not implement a program that transferred the 
ownership of at least 25% of large-state owned enterprises to the 
private sector through vouchers and give-aways to firm insiders. 
1   Country implemented a program that transferred the ownership of 
at least 25% of large-state owned enterprises to the private sector 
through vouchers and give-aways to firm insiders. 
0 0.44 
EBRD Small-
Scale 
Privatization 
Index
† 
Scale: 1 to 4, 4* (coded as 4.3) 
1   Little progress 
2   Substantial share privatized 
3   Comprehensive program almost ready for implementation 
4   Complete privatization of small companies with tradable 
ownership rights 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial 
economies: no state ownership of small enterprises; effective 
tradability of land 
1.41 3.84 
EBRD Large-
Scale 
Privatization 
Index
† 
Scale: 1 to 4, 4* (coded as 4.3) 
1   Little private ownership 
2   Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some 
sales completed 
3   More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private 
hands or in the process of being privatized (with the process 
having reached a stage at which the state has effectively ceded its 
ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues 
regarding corporate governance. 
4   More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets 
in private ownership and significant progress on corporate 
governance of these enterprises. 
1.12 3.05 4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial 
economies: more than 75 per cent of enterprise assets in private 
ownership with effective corporate governance 
Note: Mean scores presented for 25 transition countries. 
† - Variable definitions were 
originally developed in 1994 but were refined and amended in later reports; 
Presented definition are quoted directly from the EBRD 1999 Transition Report. 
“Transition indicator scores reflect the judgment of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief 
Economist about country-specific progress in transition” (EBRD 2007). 
 
 
Mortality Data 
A potential limitation to the analysis of health data during transition is the validity 
and reliability of health surveillance. More specifically, there are concerns about shifts in 
mortality stemming from the development of new monitoring and detection methods, as 
well as inaccurate or mis-classification of death resulting from the transformation of 
health systems. Such unobserved relationships or measurement errors may obscure the 
relationship between health outcomes and privatization programs.  Overall, the consensus 
from scholars is that, despite these limitations, the data during reform periods are 
sufficiently valid and reliable to permit empirical analyses for comparative purposes (E. 
Brainder and D. Cutler). More generally, mortality data is regarded as more reliable for 
comparative analysis than macroeconomic data (R. Filer and J. Hanousek, 2001).  
Nonetheless the analysis copes with potential distortions in four ways. First, the 
variation between countries is removed by controlling for country-specific effects. This 
method effectively holds constant any country’s differential propensity to underreport 
mortality.
 As long as the bias over time does not change, comparisons over time will be 
consistent. Second, a set of dummy variables for each year is used to absorb any 
classification bias arising from changing international death classification codes, which would cause sudden breaks in the data.
7 Third, a control for military conflict is used to 
compensate for underreporting in specific countries during turbulent periods highlighted 
as problematic by WHO. Fourth, life expectancy data from the WB World Development 
Indicators are used to predict variations in life expectancy data from the WHO 2007 data 
as a statistical technique to purge measurement errors, which produces attenuation bias, 
from variation in the data. As a robustness check, the predicted life expectancy data are 
used as dependent variables. 
 
Health Production Function 
Our main specification follows the standard health-production model, which is 
based on the concept of an individual-specific health production function originated by 
Grossman (1972) and later advanced upon by Anand and Chen (1996): 
 
  (1)  Hit  = ƒ(Qit, HCit, Dit, Nit, Zit, Vit, Sit), 
 
where Qit is a vector of economic and policy variables; D is a vector of demographic 
characteristics; HCit is non-health human capital; Nit is a vector of dietary and nutritional 
inputs; Zit is a vector of medical resources; Vit is a vector of environmental conditions; 
and Sit is a vector of individual country characteristics.  
Combining available comparative data, we specify a basic model:   
 (2a)  LEit = α + β1PRIVit + β2GDPit + β3LIBit + β4DEMit + β5WARit + 
β6URBANit + β7EDUCit + β8DEPit + θλit + µi + ηt + εit 
                                                 
7 This was particularly notable for infant mortality, for which a structural break occurred in 1992/1993 
when the more restrictive Soviet-era definition was substituted for the WHO definition (Shkolnikov 1997).  
 (2b)  MPRIVit = α + γ1ETHit + γ 2DEBTit-1 + γ 3FSUit + γ4 Xit + δit 
 
Here LE is male life expectancy and PRIV is one of the three privatization variables 
described previously. We operationalize Q in eq. 1 using five variables: the natural log of 
GDP per capita (GDP), which is a robust determinant of health (L. Pritchett, Summers, 
LH., 1996); the EBRD price liberalization index (LIB), because price setting by markets 
was theorized to be the main complementary policy needed for privatization to succeed 
(Selowsky 1997); the Freedom House democratization index (DEM), which was 
theorized to exert independent health benefits and facilitate transition (O. Adeyi, G. 
Chellaraj, E. Goldstein, et al 1997); and the occurrence of military or ethnic conflict, 
including civil war (WAR), which carries direct population health consequences and 
damages social infrastructure. HC is specified as the percentage of population with 
tertiary education which proxies for individual health knowledge and non-health public 
sector capacity (EDUC). D is specified using two variables: first, the percentage of 
population living in urban settings, as processes of urbanization shape individual access 
to healthcare, employment, and exposure to risk factors (URBAN), and second, 
population dependency ratios (DEP), with youth and elderly as dependents, to adjust for 
pressure on healthcare systems, as youth and elderly consume the greatest amount of 
healthcare, and population ageing, which independently affects mortality. λ is the Inverse-Mill ratio calculated from the first-stage, µ is a vector of country-specific 
dummies, and η is a vector of period dummies.
8 
In the first stage equation 2b, MPRIV is the binary variable for implementation of 
mass privatization, ETH measures the size of the second largest ethnic minority as a 
percentage of the population stratified into three categories, DEBT is the natural log of 
total external debt, with a zero for countries and periods which features no debt, FSU is a 
regional dummy for membership in the Former Soviet Union, and X indicates that the 
first stage nests the second stage covariates to avoid misspecification. 
Our main hypothesis is that β1<0. We also hypothesize that β2>0, β3<0, β4>0, 
β5>0, β6<0, β7>0, and β8<0.  
 
Serial Correlation, Heteroskedasticity, and Unit Roots 
 
Testing our data for nonconstant variance with the Breusch-Pagan method 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also find evidence of first-order 
autocorrelation in our panel. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reject the presence of unit 
roots in the life expectancy data.
9 Thus we specify an AR(1) model with country-specific 
serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten transformation and generalized least squares 
estimation to produce asymptotically consistent parameters.  Robust panel-corrected 
standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) are calculated to adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
                                                 
8 Due to the lack of available data, as robustness checks, we model N as caloric availability. We also 
subsequently model Z as logged per capita health expenditures. Comparative environmental panel data are 
unavailable (Ivaschenko, 2006). 
 
9 Using the following equation to test the null that α = 0 based on the critical values in Dickey-Fuller, 1950: 
∆LEt = αLEt-1 + β 1∆LEt-1 + β2∆LEt-2 + ... εt  contemporaneous correlation across panels. Since the panel is unbalanced, the covariance 
matrix is generated using all available observations rather than only time periods without 
missing data (which produces slightly higher standard errors here) unless the matrix is 
not full rank or not positive definite.  
 
Results 
 
First we present our basic model of the effect of privatization on male life 
expectancy, followed by tests of the consequences of earlier and more extensive 
privatization strategies. We then undertake a series of robustness checks to account for 
potential endogeneity and strengthen the case for causality. 
 
Effect of Privatization Policy on Male Life Expectancy 
 
  Table 3 shows the results of the basic equation. All three privatization measures, 
both with and without controls for fixed effects, cause significant male life expectancy 
losses. Although the coefficients vary, the net effects are similar in size, ranging from 
1.28 years lost for countries which implemented mass privatization to between 0.56 and 
0.98 years lost in those same countries for average increases in the EBRD privatization 
indicators.  
To put these effects in perspective, according to our model a doubling of per 
capita GDP would achieve roughly a 1.60 year increase in male life expectancy. That is, 
growth would need to increase by nearly 80% just to offset the social harms of privatization as measured by life expectancy losses. However, since most countries 
experienced a severe depression following market liberalization (N. Campos and F. 
Coricelli 2002, B. Merlevede and K. Schoors 2004, UNDP 1999), declining GDP per 
capita further contributed to the Postcommunist mortality crisis. 
  Several of our other controls have important effects. Price liberalization is 
positive and significant in the pooled OLS model, but has no effect once controls for 
country- and time-specific effects are included. Democratization improves male life 
expectancy, which is consistent with other empirical findings (A. Franco, A. Alvarez-
Dardet, M. Ruiz, 2004). Military conflict has a positive effect in the pooled OLS which 
other studies have found in the transition context (M. Suhrcke, 2000), although this is 
likely driven by underreporting of mortality (WHO, 2007). Once fixed effects are added 
which control for surveillance changes, the occurrence of military conflict is estimated to 
reduce male life expectancy by between -0.70 and -0.80 years. Education has no effect. 
Both greater urbanization and higher dependency ratios decrease life expectancy as 
predicted. 
Since the two EBRD variables are highly correlated (r = 0.85) and don’t appear to 
be capturing systematically different relationships with regard to life expectancy 
outcomes, we proceed using an average of the EBRD privatization indices to dilute 
measurement error. 
 
 
 
 Testing Rapid versus Gradual Privatization Strategies 
 
  There are two ways that the pace of privatization has been treated in the literature: 
in terms of how early privatization reforms were implemented and how extensive those 
reforms were. While most empirical analyses consider one or the other, in Tables 4a and 
4b we test both. First we interact EBRD privatization measures with the first and second 
half of the transition period. Each one point increase in privatization prior to 1996 
decreased life expectancy by -0.54 years, whereas increases after 1996 were negative but 
not significant (Table 4a). These results suggest that delaying reforms to later periods 
shielded populations from social harms associated with privatization. Second we test the 
effect of more extensive privatization by breaking privatization scores into four intervals. 
Table 4b shows evidence that higher privatization scores, as compared with little or no 
privatization, became increasingly more adverse to male life expectancy, albeit at a 
decreasing rate. Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that countries 
which adopted earlier and more extensive privatization reforms – or more “rapid” 
privatization programs – had greater social costs. 
 
Effect of Privatization Reversals on Male Life Expectancy 
 
  To further show that the direction of causality runs from privatization to worse 
health and not the other way around, we code an indicator for whether the EBRD 
privatization indices decreased from the previous period (not shown). In this model, the 
coefficient for a privatization reversal is positive 0.26 and significant at p<0.05. Together with the previous findings, this shows that greater increases in a country’s privatization 
decrease male life expectancy and that conversely when countries reverse privatization its 
male life expectancy improves as a result.   
 
Sample and Specification Robustness Checks 
 
We next sequentially add several variables identified by the individual health 
production model (eq. 3) to the right-hand side in order to test the robustness of our basic 
findings. None of the additional controls had any significant effect (Table 5). However, in 
several models the coefficient of privatization was modestly attenuated or enhanced, 
although this could occur simply due to variations in the sample size as a result of 
missing data.  
 
Endogeneous Selection Bias 
  
  Lastly, we evaluate the possibility that unobserved societal or economic 
conditions may account for both the adoption of mass privatization policies and the 
mortality crisis net of our controls. Perhaps, the countries with the worst predisposing 
conditions, or as some argue, most corrupt governments (B. Black, Kraakman, R., and A. 
Tarassova, 2000), adopt rapid privatization programs as a measure of desperation. If this 
were the case, it is plausible that life expectancy was going to fall in the countries which 
implemented mass privatization irrespective of the policy. Table 6 shows the results of 2SLS and Heckman-type selection models.
10 The 
coefficient on the EBRD average privatization index is -0.42, which does not 
significantly differ from models without using instrumentation. However, we find 
evidence of endogeneity for mass privatization – even with controls for fixed effects. The 
estimated effect of mass privatization significantly increases to -2.24, and the selection 
coefficient is positive and significant at p<0.05. These results suggest that failing to 
control for unobserved differences between countries that privatized and countries that 
didn’t privatize understates the relationship between mass privatization and mortality.  
The first step model of the determinants of privatization suggests why this is the 
case (Appendix 1). The biggest factor in explaining intra-former Soviet Union variation 
in privatization is ethno-national structure, which is historically determined. Those 
regions that were industrialized under the Soviet Union had a large ethnic Russian 
population that staffed many of the specialist occupations of the new enterprises. Thus, 
the countries that mass privatized were also likely to be the more industrialized ones, and 
as a result were more protected from large-scale economic disturbances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Our instruments satisfy required statistical properties. Greater sizes of the Russian minority, membership 
in the Former Soviet Union, and increased external debt are each significantly scorrelated with mass 
privatization. Tests for overidentification, or regressing the residuals from the second-stage model using the 
full set of controls on the instrument set, reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with 
the error term of the male life expectancy equation. This reinforces the claim that the size of the ethnic 
Russian population, membership in the former Soviet Union, and logged external debt levels, after 
adjustment for the set of controls described, affects our health measures through increasing a country’s 
likelihood of adopting mass privatization as a property reform strategy (orthogonality condition). 
 Discussion 
 
Rapid privatization, by increasing male death rates, played a critical role in the 
past century’s worst peacetime mortality crisis. Even if successive empirical analysis 
proves growth benefits, it is extremely unlikely that these gains will be sufficient in 
magnitude and equitable in distribution to outweigh the tremendous social costs 
identified in our study. This line of analysis, by using health data as an indicator of 
economic success or failure, offers one of the first expressions of Amartya Sen’s 
recommendations for empirical welfare evaluations of economic policies (A. Sen, 1998). 
Despite our rigorous robustness checks and efforts to account for potential 
endogeneity, our analysis has several methodological limitations. First, there are no 
comparative privatization rate data available. The existing EBRD indices are subject to 
considerable bias, and “reflect the judgment of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief 
Economist about country-specific progress in transition.” Given that the Post-Soviet 
episodes of privatization have been without doubt the largest economic experiment in 
modern history, such limitations to evaluative infrastructure are of concern. Monitoring 
and evaluation of policy experiments in milieu should focus both on program 
implementation and outcomes. In many contexts, such as the Postcommunist one, the 
linkage between the two is not direct, and our study is as a result unable to fully 
differentiate between these aspects.  
Second, although we control for differences in health surveillance between 
countries, there is potential for bias arising from time-varying surveillance changes 
within countries. It is, however, unlikely that the temporal variation in surveillance can account for the relationship between privatization and health net of our control variables. 
Since studies have linked privatization to decreased state capacity (L. King and P. Hamm 
2005), and as a result worsened health surveillance which would lead to greater 
underreporting, the direction of the potential bias is probably conservative. 
Finally, as with all cross-country studies there is potential for ecologic fallacy. 
However a large body of ethnographic and micro-level research supports our hypothesis, 
and it is plausible that rapid privatization, by catastrophically increasing work-related 
stress and eroding social safety nets, fuels mortality increases (E. Brainerd, 1998). In a 
longer version of this article, we find that rapid privatization explains increases in 
alcohol-related mortality, suicides and heart-disease mortality. 
  Keynes, in writing about Stalinism in 1933, foreshadows the implications of 
Sachs-Shleifer-Fischer’s “transition economics” (Yale Review):  
 
“We have a fearful example in Russia today of the evils of insane and 
unnecessary haste. The sacrifices and losses of transition will be vastly 
greater if the pace is forced…”References 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
     
Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean (SD)  Number of Observations 
Male Life 
Expectancy 66.27  (3.57)  322 
EBRD Large-
Scale Privatization 
Index 2.41  (0.98)  309 
EBRD Small-
Scale Privatization 
Index 3.11  (1.14)  309 
Mass Privatization  0.33 (0.47)  340 
Log GDP per 
Capita 7.28  (0.96)  340 
EBRD Price 
Liberalization   3.21 (0.93)  340 
Democratization
  7.26  (3.48)  340 
Military Conflict  0.06 (0.24)  367 
Education  23.38 (12.05)  313 
Urbanization  56.63 (12.46)  340 
Dependency Ratio  53.41 (10.50)  340 
     
     
Correlation Matrix 
Male Life 
Expectancy  1.00          
EBRD Large-
Scale Privatization 
Index  0.19  1.00        
EBRD Small-
Scale Privatization 
Index  0.28  0.84 1.00       
Mass  Privatization  -0.30  0.40 0.35 1.00      
Log GDP per 
Capita  0.22  0.39 0.39 -0.11 1.00     
EBRD Price 
Liberalization   0.27  0.71 0.74 0.38 0.17 1.00      
Democratization
   -0.31  -0.52 -0.51 -0.13 -0.69 -0.39 1.00     
Military Conflict  0.12  -0.26 -0.14 -0.18 0.02 -0.07 0.03  1.00   
Education 0.08  0.48 0.49 0.20 0.56 0.49 -0.57  -0.04  1.00
Urbanization -0.13  0.22 0.13 0.20 0.62 0.14 -0.53  -0.05  0.45 1.00
Dependency Ratio  -0.21  -0.39 -0.39 -0.18 -0.71 -0.38 0.67 -0.08 -0.58 -0.76
            Note: † - Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 ‡ -Prais-Winsten transformation used to 
accommodate AR(1) disturbance with robust panel-corrected standard errors; models also 
control for two-way fixed effects. Hausman-Taylor χ
2 = 44.23 (p<0.01), favors fixed effects 
over random effects. 
* - p<0.05, ** - p<0.01, *** - p<0.001
Table 3. Effect of Privatization Policy on Life Expectancy in 25 Transition Countries, 
1991-2002 
 Pooled  OLS
† Fixed  Effects
‡ 
Covariates (I)  (II)  (III) (III) (IV) (V) 
EBRD Large-Scale 
Privatization Index 
-0.63 
(0.27)* 
– –  -0.25 
(0.12)* 
– – 
EBRD Small-Scale 
Privatization Index 
– -0.38 
(0.27) 
– –  -0.35 
(0.14)* 
– 
Mass Privatization  –  –  -2.81 
(0.42)***
– –  -1.28 
(0.23)***
Log GDP per 
Capita 
1.07 
(0.28)*** 
1.04 
(0.33)** 
0.12       
(0.31) 
1.81 
(0.31)***
1.72 
(0.31)*** 
1.46 
(0.33)***
Price 
Liberalization  
1.10 
(0.29)*** 
1.00 
(0.32)** 
1.10  
(0.22)***
-0.20 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
Democratization
  
0.32 
(0.08)*** 
0.30 
(0.08)***
0.32  
(0.07)***
0.22 
(0.07)** 
0.23 
(0.07)*** 
0.21 
(0.07)***
Military Conflict  0.32 
(0.68) 
0.63 
(0.65) 
0.15       
(0.52) 
-0.72 
(0.31)* 
-0.70 
(0.31)* 
-0.80 
(0.25)***
Education -0.07 
(0.02)*** 
-0.07 
(0.02)***
-0.06 
(0.02)***
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Urbanization -0.19 
(0.02)*** 
-0.19 
(0.02)***
-0.15 
(0.02)***
-0.22 
(0.06)***
-0.23 
(0.05)*** 
-0.19 
(0.06)***
Dependency Ratio  -0.13 
(0.03)*** 
-0.13 
(0.03)***
-0.15 
(0.03)***
-0.23 
(0.06)***
-0.26 
(0.06)*** 
-0.23 
(0.07)***
        
N  x  T  302 302 302 302 302 302 
N  25 25 25 25 25 25 
R
2  0.35 0.35 0.44 0.92 0.92 0.93     
Table 4a. Effects of Early versus Late 
Privatization 
Dependent Variable: Male Life Expectancy 
Covariates  Prior to 
1996 
Post 
 1996  
EBRD Average  
Privatization Index  
-0.54 
(0.21)**  
-0.07 
(0.46)  
Note: Robust panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
Models control for the effects of price liberalization, occurrence 
of military and ethnic conflict, percentage of population urban, 
age-dependency ratio, and percentage population with tertiary 
education and country- and time-dummies. 
 
 
Table 4b. Effects of Extensive Privatization  
Dependent Variable: Male Life Expectancy 
Threshold Average  Privatization 
Index >=3.5  -0.76 (0.33)* 
2.5< Index <=3.5  -0.61 (0.24)* 
1.5< Index <=2.5  -0.34 (0.19) 
Reference <=1.5  – 
Note: All effects are jointly significant at p<0.001 based on 
robust panel-corrected standard errors calculated using χ
2(3). 
Models control for the effects of price liberalization, 
occurrence of military and ethnic conflict, percentage of 
population urban, age-dependency ratio, and percentage 
population with tertiary education and country- and time-
dummies.Table 5. Sample and Specification Robustness Checks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results presented from 20 separate regression models. Robust panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
Q, Z, and N correspond to the health-production function in eq. 3.
Covariates  Coefficient 
of Control 
Coefficient of Mass 
Privatization 
Coefficient 
of Control 
Coefficient of EBRD 
Avg. Privatization  N 
Economic and Policy (Q)         
Foreign Direct Investment  0.02 
(0.01) 
-1.25 
(0.23)*** 
0.03  
(0.02) 
-0.45  
(0.14)**  302 
EBRD Foreign Exchange & 
Trade Liberalization 
0.15  
(0.11) 
-1.43  
(0.24)*** 
0.06  
(0.11) 
-0.47  
(0.15)**  290 
Hyperinflation -0.08   
(0.16) 
-1.29  
(0.23)*** 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
-0.43  
(0.15)**  302 
Health System (Z)         
Log Health Spending per 
Capita 
-0.09  
(0.17) 
-1.19  
(0.25)*** 
-0.05     
(0.16) 
-0.42 
 (0.17)*  258 
Health Spending as a 
Percentage of Total 
Government Spending 
2.63  
(2.05) 
-1.23  
(0.23)*** 
2.58 
 (1.94) 
-0.37 
(0.16)*  253 
Number of Physicians per 
1000 population 
0.03  
(0.21) 
-1.28  
(0.22)*** 
0.25  
(0.23) 
-0.42 
(0.17)***  281 
Hospital Beds  -0.03  
(0.09) 
-1.57  
(0.21)*** 
0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.43  
(0.20)*  274 
Diet and Nutrition (N)         
Protein Availability  0.08  
(0.10) 
-1.25  
(0.23)*** 
0.10  
(0.10) 
-0.51  
(0.16)***  297 
Log Fruit and Vegetable 
Availability 
0.36  
(0.59) 
-1.34  
(0.23)*** 
0.53  
(0.53) 
-0.62  
(0.20)**  281 
Log Caloric Availability  0.13 
 (0.92) 
-1.47  
(0.23)*** 
-0.37 
(0.93) 
-0.54 
(0.17)**  299  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Results presented from four separate 
regression models. †
 - Robust panel-corrected 
standard errors in parentheses.  ‡ - Robust standard 
errors adjust for selection. Models control for the 
effects of price liberalization, occurrence of military 
and ethnic conflict, percentage of population urban, 
age-dependency ratio, and percentage population 
with tertiary education and country- and time-
dummies. 
* - p<0.05, ** - p<0.01, *** - p<0.001
Table 6. 2SLS and Selection Models, 1991-2002 
Covariates 2SLS
† Treatment 
Effects
‡ 
EBRD Average 
Privatization Index 
-0.42 
(0.15)** 
– 
Mass Privatization  –  -2.24 
(0.55)*** 
Selection Coefficient (λ) –  0.73 
(0.33)* Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
 
Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Source 
Log GDP per Capita  Gross Domestic Product per capita US$ 2000  340  7.28  0.96  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2005 Edition 
Democratization  Sum of Heritage Foundation Political Freedom and 
Civil Liberties Index 
340 7.26  3.48 Heritage  Foundation 
Price Liberalization  EBRD Price Liberalization Index, scale of 1 
(planned) to 4.3 (market) in increments of 0.3 
340  3.21  0.93  Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Structural Change 
Indicators 
Foreign Exchange & 
Trade Liberalization 
EBRD Foreign Exchange & Trade Liberalization 
Index, scale of 1 (planned) to 4.3 (market) in 
increments of 0.3 
321  3.12  1.24  Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Structural Change 
Indicators 
Average Privatization  Average of EBRD Small- and Large-Scale 
Privatization Indices 
309  2.76  1.01  Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development Structural Change 
Indicators 
Foreign Direct Investment   Log foreign direct investment as  a percentage of 
GDP 
340  0.03  0.04  World Bank World Development 
Indicators 2005 Edition 
Physicians  Number of physicians per 1,000 population  286  3.05  0.85  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007 
Health Spending  Public health spending as a percentage of GDP  263  3.92  1.72  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007 
Hospital Beds  Number of hospital beds per 100,000 population  278  8.49  2.68  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007 
Caloric Intake  Average number of calories available per person 
per day 
311  2831.28  393.01  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007 
Protein  Percentage of total energy available from protein  309  11.92  1.19  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007 
Fruit and Vegetables  Availability of fruits and vegetables in 10 
kilograms per person per day  
293  151.66  42.88  World Health Organization European 
Health for All Database 2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: †
 - evaluated at marginal effects at mean values. Robust 
standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
 
Appendix 2. Determinants of Privatization 
Covariates Mass 
Privatization 
Probit
† 
EBRD Average 
Privatization 
LPM 
Log External Debt  0.01 
(0.01)* 
0.03  
(0.00)*** 
Titular Nationality  -0.17 
(0.05)*** 
-0.16   
(0.06)** 
Former Soviet Union  0.57 
(0.09)*** 
0.53  
(0.11)*** 
Log GDP per Capita  -0.20 
(0.05)*** 
0.47  
(0.06)*** 
EBRD Price Liberalization  0.17 
(0.04)*** 
0.58  
(0.04)*** 
Democratization 0.04 
(0.01)*** 
-0.07  
(0.01)*** 
Military Conflict  -0.15    
(0.04)* 
-0.33      
 (0.18) 
Dependency Ratio  -0.02 
(0.01)** 
-0.00       
(0.01) 
Urbanization  0.01      
(0.01) 
-0.03  
(0.01)*** 
Education -0.01 
(0.00)*** 
-0.00      
 (0.01) 
    
N x T  313  313 
N 25  25 
Pseudo-R
2 0.52  0.77 Appendix 3. Privatization Scores and Life Expectancy Losses, 1991-2002 
Note: † - denotes index value in 2002. Excess mortality is calculated as the sum of each year’s life 
expectancy difference from 1991 to 2002:  ) (
2002
1992
1991 ∑ − − LE LECurrent . Negative values indicate net 
life expectancy gains during the transition period. Mass Privatization codings are taken from the 
Enterprise Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report series. 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
IMPLEMENTED 
MASS 
PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAM 
SMALL-SCALE 
PRIVATIZATION
† 
LARGE-SCALE 
PRIVATIZATION
† 
EXCESS MORTALITY 
(NET YEARS OF 
MALE LIFE 
EXPECTANCY LOST) 
ALBANIA No 4.0 3.0  7.28 
ARMENIA Yes 3.7  3.0  -10.04 
AZERBAIJAN No  3.3  2.0  5.33 
BELARUS No 2.0 1.0  -11.99 
BULGARIA No  3.7  3.7  -5.75 
CROATIA  No 4.3  3.0  15.12 
CZECH Yes  4.3  4.0 8.61 
ESTONIA No  4.3 4.0  -9.86 
GEORGIA Yes 4.0  3.3  -11.24 
HUNGARY No  4.3  4.0  1.88 
KAZAKHSTAN Yes  4.0  3.0  -17.31 
KYRGYZSTAN Yes  4.0  3.0  -13.45 
LATVIA Yes  4.3  3.0 -12.97 
LITHUANIA Yes  4.3  3.3  -7.04 
MACEDONIA No  4.0  3.0  5.73 
MOLDOVA Yes  3.7  3.0  -6.67 
POLAND No  4.3  3.3  9.02 
ROMANIA Yes 3.7  3.3  -7.80 
RUSSIA Yes  4.0  3.3 -23.00 
SLOVAKIA No  4.3  4.0  0.89 
SLOVENIA No  4.3  3.0  5.27 
TAJIKISTAN No  3.7  2.3  -21.61 
TURKMENISTAN No  2.0  1.0  -1.67 
UKRAINE Yes 3.3  3.0  -13.21 
UZBEKISTAN No  3.0  2.7  -3.14  
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